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March has been the month of big political decisions in 
Indonesia for three years now. In March 1966 President Soekarno, 
faced with a tumult of hostile student demonstrations, and with 
unprecedentedly threatening pressure from a newly self-confident 
army leadership, signed over most of his powers to the com­
mander of the army, General Suharto.
In March 1967, Indonesia's super-parliament, the M.P.R.S. 
(Interim People's Consultative Congress), met in an atmosphere 
of great tension. Suharto had concluded that Soekarno could 
not be persuaded to cooperate with the army on terms which 
acknowledged its hegemony, and so had to be thrown out; it 
seemed to many that an attempt to oust the president might lead 
to a clash between pro-Soekarno units of the armed services and 
militantly pro-New Order units. But this was averted. Thanks 
to Suharto's steering skills and caution, and his willingness to 
leave Soekarno the vestigial insignia of his old glory, it was 
possible to strip the president of all his powers without giving 
rise to major disturbances.2 Suharto himself was named acting 
president.
In March 1968 there was a further session of the M.P.R.S. 
This time there was less sense of crisis than a year earlier, 
and much less than in March 1966. Suharto and his associates 
were in reasonably comfortable control of the country. Political 
excitement rose to a high pitch at several points, but there was 
no fear of violent clashes of any size.
1. An earlier version of this article appeared in Australia's 
Neighbours, May-June 1968. Because the editors of Indonesia 
felt that this study is an important contribution to under­
standing the politics of Indonesia's New Order— a subject
on which far too few studies have as yet appeared— they 
have endeavored to give it wider circulation by publishing 
it in revised form here. The editors wish to express their 
gratitude to Australia's Neighbours for granting them per­
mission to do so.
2. However, over eighty people lost their lives when paracommando
units stormed the village fortress of the pro-Soekarno mil- 
lenarian leader, Mbah Suro, as the M.P.R.S. session was open­
ing. The Mbah Suro story is most interestingly told in David 
Mitchell, "Communists, Mystics and Sukarnoism," Dissent 
(Melbourne), Autumn 1968. See also Willard A. Hanna, ^The 
Magical-Mystical Syndrome in the Indonesian Mentality, Part 
III: The Rise and Fall of Mbah Suro," American Universities




The principal importance of this M.P.R.S. session lay in 
the fact that it forced Suharto and his colleagues to make up 
their minds about the political arrangements through which they 
would work thenceforth, about the political forces and political 
machinery they would use as the props and conveyor belts of their 
power. As the session approached they had to stake positions in 
relation to a number of difficult dilemmas of political format 
on which they had hitherto postponed decisions.
If one looks at the three successive months of March in 
terms of inferred questions in General Suharto’s mind, the ques­
tion up to March 1966 was "Shall we side with the students 
against Soekarno?" and the question up to March 1967 "How can 
we finally oust Soekarno without provoking rebellion among his 
followers?". In the months before March 1968 the questions were 
"Who will be our partners in power?", "To whom shall we accord the 
right to participate in representative and electoral politics, 
and to whom shall we deny this right?" and "How far shall we allow 
ourselves to be tied down by civilians, by constitutional pre­
scriptions concerning elections, the powers of representative 
bodies, freedom of the press, assembly and demonstration, and 
so on?"
Suharto was in fact in a situation similar to that of 
Soekarno in 1958-1959, when he had defeated the groups which 
stood squarely in the path of his "Guided Democracy" but had 
yet to forge or impose agreement among his supporters for the 
new set of political machinery which would be rationalized by 
the triumphant symbol.3 The symbolism of the "New Order" did 
not point as sharply to changes of political structure as had 
that of "Guided Democracy," but it certainly called for such 
transformations.
The M.P.R.S. and the Prospect of Elections
The idea of a People’s Consultative Congress (M.P.R.) as 
the highest organ of state had been introduced with the con­
stitution of 1945. Under this constitution, based partly, it 
seems, on a Nationalist Chinese model, the People’s Consulta­
tive Assembly would elect the president and he would be re­
sponsible to it. But the congress would meet fairly infre­
quently; the constitution spoke of a maximum interval of five 
years between sessions. And the president would not be re­
sponsible to the more frequently meeting parliament (D.P.R.), 
nor could that body oust him. He would thus be a very strong 
chief executive.
3. See Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: 
Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), pp. 164ff.
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Though it was generally assumed that the congress should be 
a popularly elected body, none has ever been elected. In Septem­
ber 1960 President Soekarno established an interim congress, or 
M.P.R.S.; its members included the 281 men and women who were 
members of the current (nominated) parliament and another 335 
who had just been named by the president to represent particular 
regions or functional groups. In the case of the party repre­
sentatives, particular names were decided upon by a process of 
bargaining between Soekarno and his assistants on the one hand 
and the party leaders on the other. In the case of those chosen 
as representatives of particular regions and functional groups-- 
the latter mostly paper organizations— the bargaining was often 
with leaders of the army.
Three sessions of the M.P.R.S. were held before Soekarno's 
fall. In each case the government was actively concerned that 
the congress be seen to have prestige, and so was obliged— and 
willing— to make minor concessions to the demands of its members, 
and particularly to those of the larger legal parties. But the 
power of the congress remained slight. Its pliability was 
highlighted by its decision of May 1963 to make Soekarno 
President-for-Life.
It seems that General Suharto decided soon after his assump­
tion of executive powers in March 1966 to use the M.P.R.S. as a 
principal instrument for the political remodelling on which he 
was embarking. Thus a fourth session of the large body was held 
in June-July 1966— after 136 of its members had been dismissed 
as Communists or prevented from attending because of their mem­
bership in the Communist-sympathizing Partindo party (and another 
142 had been replaced by new men of their parties, regions, and 
functional groups). *
Suharto was attracted to the M.P.R.S. as a vehicle because 
he wanted de-Soekarnoization to proceed in an orderly fashion 
rather than taking place through the "parliament of the streets" 
as some of the student groups and other pacemakers of the New 
Order were proposing. But he was in no position to stage-manage 
the session. In fact he was obliged--partly because he was not 
yet firmly in control of the executive and partly because of the 
intense support for "democracy" among many of his civilian sup­
porters— to endow the congress with greater prestige and more 
actual decisional power than it had ever enjoyed before. And 
there is a sense in which he tied himself to the M.P.R.S. as an 
institution at its mid-1966 session, in that he chose to have 
this body confer upon him the executive and emergency powers 4
4. On this M.P.R.S. session, and the politics of 1966 gener­
ally, see R. K. Paget, "The Military, in Indonesian Politics: 
The Burden of Power," Pacific Affairs (XL, 3-4), Fall and 
Winter 1967-68, pp. 294-314.
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which he had held only as a "gift" from Soekarno up to that time. 
Finally, he added to the likelihood that the M.P.R.S. would re­
main somewhat autonomous by maneuvering General Nasution into 
chairmanship of the body. Nasution had been Suharto1s main 
rival for the presidency up to that session of the congress.
His acceptance of the M.P.R.S. chairmanship (and a subsequent 
congress decision that Suharto should exercise the functions 
of the presidency in the event of Soekarno being unable to do 
so) removed him from that contest. But it left the general with 
an interest in maintaining, and perhaps expanding the newly 
achieved semi-independence of the M.P.R.S.
In the following eighteen months the political significance 
of the M.P.R.S. grew as the prospect of early elections receded. 
According to a decision of the M.P.R.S.!s mid-1966 session, 
elections for a new parliament and M.P.R.S. were to be held by 
July 1968. But the government’s commitment to this date was 
treated with more and more scepticism as time went on. The 
academic economists advising General Suharto were known to re­
gard early elections as a threat to their effort at economic 
stabilization, their assumption being that the parties would 
again succeed, as they did in the 1955 elections, in siphoning 
off large amounts of government money to finance their campaign­
ing. And there was considerable support in the army and among 
civilian New Order militants for the view that democrats should 
not rush to organize elections in conditions where the enemies 
of democracy (read pro-Soekarno forces) were likely to emerge 
victorious. In mid-1967 Suharto spoke several times of the 
possibility that elections would have to be postponed.
Within parliament there was sharp disagreement about the 
electoral system to be adopted. In February 1967 the govern­
ment submitted a bill which provided for single-member con­
stituencies and took the kabupaten or regency as the consti­
tuency unit. This was linked in the minds of government leaders 
and their political braintrusters with ideas of forming a 
"Grand Alliance of New Order Forces" (or "New Order Front" or 
"Movement for Pantja Sila Democracy") which would put forward 
a single candidate in each constituency. The government lead­
ers’ hope was that this would make it possible to transcend 
the older pattern of a plurality of more or less ideological 
parties based on particular cultural communities. It would 5
5. Mahasiswa Indonesia (Edisi Djawa Barat), (II, 43), 2nd week 
of April, 1967. This West Java student journal was the lead­
ing spokesman for this view. Compare the statement of the 
Working Conference of the student action front K.A.M.I. held 
in June 1967: "It is appropriate to hold elections as a
means of realizing the ideals of democracy as set down by 
the M.P.R.S., provided that priority is given to seeing to 
it that the outcome ensures the greater freedom of the forces 
of New Order democracy." Kompas (Djakarta), June 12, 1967.
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certainly have resulted in a drastic under-representation of 
Java— for the average Java kabupaten has almost four times 
the population of the average kabupaten in the outer islands. 
Opposition to the bill was understandably strong in a parlia­
ment which was dominated by the Nationalist P.N.I. and the con­
servative Islamic Nahdatul Ulama (N.U.), both regarded as ideo­
logical parties and both drawing most of their strength from 
Java. In November 1967 the special commission of parliament 
charged with considering the bill changed it to provide for some 
members to be elected by proportional representation.6 But this 
in turn angered the government and the New Order militants, and 
so, after some demonstrations outside parliament by a group of 
Bandung students (who were reportedly sponsored by the West Java 
military commander Major General Dharsono), the government with­
drew the bill completely, announcing that it would draw up 
another.
By taking this action, after almost nine months of parlia­
mentary discussion of the earlier bill, the government set its 
foot firmly on the road to a major postponement of elections.
One effect of this was to give questions of political restruc­
turing a new urgency. A closely related effect was to suggest 
that the next session of the M.P.R.S., which was being talked 
of as likely to be held in March 1968, would have to take de­
cisions of a far-reaching kind which had previously been thought 
of as the business of an elected, permanent congress. The man­
date Suharto had received as acting president was till the 
elections only. Would he ask the forthcoming M.P.R.S. session 
for a new mandate, and, if so, as "acting president" or as "presi­
dent"? For what period of time? With or without the emergency 
powers currently vested in him? With a vice-president, as the 
current (1945) constitution seemed to require? If so, with 
whom?
Parliament and the Demands to Overhaul 
the Party System
More immediately the New Order militants were presenting 
the government with a dilemma by pressing for a radical overhaul 
of parliament (whose members also belonged to the M.P.R.S., 
comprising one-half that body). The origins of the current 
parliament lay in the 283-man D.P.R. appointed by President 
Soekarno in June 1960. Its 30 Communist members and a number of 
others had been'suspended in the wake of the coup and counter­
coup of October 1965, and 108 new members had been appointed in 
January 1967. But the leaders of the students’ and intellec­
tuals1 action fronts and other New Order radicals insisted that 
it was still Old Order in spirit, and adduced its attitude in the
6. The resulting "combined system" is described in Angkatan 
Bersendjata (Djakarta), November 27, 1967.
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question of the electoral bill as evidence. In November and 
December 1967 there was talk in the publications of the student 
action front K.A.M.I. of a withdrawal of the K.A.M.I. leaders 
who had been put into parliament the previous January unless 
the government agreed to some kind of further purge of the old 
members.
What the New Order radicals wanted was in fact no less than 
a supersession of the existing party system. In their eyes this 
system was dominated by parties through whom Soekarno had chosen 
to work, parties which were ideological and not programme- 
oriented, conservative and not committed to modernization, and 
whose adherence to the ideals of the New Order was formal and 
hypocritical.7 They did not advocate that the existing parties 
be banned or merged in a single state party; that, they felt, 
would have been to fly in the face of the symbols of democracy.
But they had come forth in the course of the preceding year with 
several proposals whereby the party system might conceivably be 
sidestepped or reduced in significance. Most important of these 
was the idea, suggested at an all-Java conference of military 
commanders in early July, that non-party civilians who had been 
active in one or other of the action fronts (and who had not 
succumbed to the pull of any of the parties since then) should 
form themselves into an "Independent Group" which the armed 
forces could take as their civilian partner. This proposal at­
tracted widespread interest, and various non-party politicians, 
from_Foreign Minister Adam Malik downwards, declared themselves 
willing to lead an Independent Group of some kind.
By November 1967 a group of intellectuals around Dr. Umar 
Kayam, the director-general of radio and television, had suc­
ceeded in establishing a rough monopoly over the Independent Group 
label. The efforts of these intellectuals to attract civilian 
support were largely unsuccessful. And their proposals for 
political restructuring, notably the idea of establishing a two- 
party system, with one party promoting faster change and one 
slower, were generally regarded as impractical. But the Umar 
Kayam group had the support of some powerful military radicals 
centering around Major General Kemal Idris (head of the Strategic 
Command) and Major General Dharsono (West Java commander and 
head of the Siliwangi division).
Suharto's record over the previous eighteen months suggested 
that he would not easily be pushed into a radical overhaul of the 
party system, for the general had consistently sought to prevent 
the anti-Soekarno reaction from going too far. This was partly 
a reflection of his strong belief in the importance of stability. 
He had declared economic stabilization and political stabilization
7. The role the parties have played since the beginning of Guided 
Democracy is most fully discussed in Daniel S. Lev, "Political 
Parties in Indonesia," Journal of Southeast Asian History 
(VIII, 1), March 1967, pp. 52-67.
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the "Twin Duties" of his cabinet, and had presented the nation 
with the "Five Forms of Order" (Political Order, Social Order, 
Economic Order, Legal Order, and Security Order) in one of his 
few attempts to cluster ideological themes in the style of 
Soekarno. But it also reflected the fact that Suharto is a 
Javanese (and one of abangan or syncretistic religious orienta­
tion, rather than of santri or strongly Muslim outlook), and 
that most of the pressure for radical de-Soekamoization came 
from non-Javanese (and a few Javanese santri).8 As if to de­
clare that he would not allow himself to become what many in 
East and Central Java, particularly P.N.I. men, were saying he 
was— an honest Javanese trapped and manipulated by slick cos­
mopolitans and fanatical Muslims from West Java and Sumatra-- 
he had taken a conciliatory approach towards such laggards in 
support of the New Order as the P.N.I. and N.U., and particularly 
towards the Soekarno-sympathizing sections of the armed services, 
the marines and other sections of the navy, and parts of the 
police. On the axis between New Order militants and New Order 
laggards, Suharto was a centrist, a balancer who sought to 
stand up to the challenges with which a strong right was pre­
senting him by not allowing the already feeble left to be 
weakened further.
Nor was Suharto's centrism that of one man. On the con­
trary, it had become the position of a powerful group of gen­
erals, strong particularly in Djakarta— men of Suharto's per­
sonal staff (S.P.R.I.), the general staff of the army, and some 
key economic agencies. Most of the officers of this group were 
Javanese from Suharto's old Central Java (Diponegoro) division 
(though the group also included two powerful Sumatrans, Major 
General Alamsjah, the head of Suharto's personal staff, and 
General Panggabean, the acting chief of staff of the army).
Their hostility to militant New Order generals like Kemal Idris 
and Dharsono carried overtones of old rivalries between the 
Diponegoro division of Central Java and the Siliwangi of West 
Java, rivalries which were themselves partly ethnic (Javanese 
versus the rest) and partly between officers considered close 
to the people and nativist and those whose style was more 
sophisticated and cosmopolitan. In addition, there was an 
element here of conflict between older officers and younger 
(for New Order militancy had greater appeal to the colonels 
and lieutenant-colonels), between Djakarta interests and regional 
ones (for the military radicals held a large number of regional 
commands), and between staff officers and soldiers in civil 
administrative posts on the one hand and fighting soldiers, 
particularly of elite units, on the other. This was by no means 
a simple bi-polar division; a host of criss-crossing loyalties
8. On Suharto's background see Willard A. Hanna, "The Magical- 
Mystical Syndrome in the Indonesian Mentality, Part V:
Pak Harto— the Myth, the Man and the Mystery," American 
Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Southeast Asia 
Series, December 1967.
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and associations blurred and complicated the pattern. But ten­
sion between the two core groups was persistent.
Suharto's ties to the S.P.R.I.-Diponegoro division generals 
were not so binding as to keep him from making concessions to 
the New Order radicals. And in the political circumstances of 
the last two months of 1967 there were strong incentives to do 
just that. One key problem was that Suharto's cautious style 
and moderate, stabilizing policies were producing a strong sense 
of drift and demoralization in the political public. Another 
was that several of his immediate assistants, including key 
figures from his personal staff and top executives of government 
economic agencies, had come to be principal targets of a vigorous 
press campaign against corruption. Moreover, prices for rice 
and many other commodities were rising precipitately in the 
last few months of the year,9 and this caused not only consumer 
resentment but increased general disillusionment with the govern­
ment's policies of budget cutting and credit restriction, neces­
sarily unpopular measures whose one immediately redeeming feature 
had been their dampening down of the earlier hyperinflation.
Finally, Suharto may have sensed real danger to his posi­
tion behind the numerous rumors circulating in November and 
December 1967 of an impending young officers' coup. Whether he 
did or not, the rumors highlighted the existence of an intensely 
dissatisfied group of colonels and lieutenant-colonels in the 
Siliwangi division and some of the mobile units under the 
Strategic Command, men who felt that Dharsono and Kemal Idris 
had been altogether too tepid in their protests against corrup­
tion, compromise, and drift.
For all these reasons the New Order radicals' ship was 
full in the sails; and Suharto had every incentive to take some 
of the wind out. In December he announced that parliament would 
be given a "redressing." The term was new, and had little recog­
nized meaning. (There was precedent in Soekarno's "retooling" 
for choosing an obscure word of English or quasi-English for 
maximum ambiguity!) What was clear was that it was a concession 
to the demands of the New Order militants, but one which fell 
short of a radical supersession of the party system.
The P.N.I. and the Neo-Masjumi
Closely related to the questions raised by critics of the 
party system as a whole were those to do with the right of
9. See D. H. Penny, J. Panglaykim, Dahlan Thalib, "Survey of
Recent Developments," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 
(Australian National University) (Nol 9), February 1968; 
also H. W. Arndt, "Survey of Recent Developments," Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies (No. 10), June 1968.
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particular parties to a legal existence. There was no dis­
agreement about the Communist Party remaining banned. But 
what about the P.N.I., which had gone along enthusiastically 
with many of the dominant trends of the pre-coup period, and 
important segments of which had remained actively pro-Soekarno 
even after March 1967? By mid-1967 it was clear that the 
efforts of an army-supported P.N.I. executive (Osa Maliki, Usep 
Ranawidjaja, and others) to make the party New Order-minded had 
run into solid opposition. The authority of the new executive 
had been fairly well established in Central Java, thanks large­
ly to the efforts of Hadisubeno Sosrowerdojo, the P.N.I. 
regional chairman, a long-time anti-Communist and an old asso­
ciate of General Suharto. But its position remained very weak 
in the other key province of East Java and in many of the 
regions outside the central island; and the continuing influ­
ence in these provinces of leaders stigmatized as "Old Order" 
served to buttress the conviction of many militants that it 
was folly to hope that the P.N.I. leopard would change his 
spots. There had long been local army-blessed harassment of 
P.N.I. branches in various places outside Java, but in the 
second half of 1967 commanders in several outer provinces, 
particularly in Sumatra, actually banned all P.N.I. activity.10
In the months before the M.P.R.S. session, and the "re­
dressing" of parliament which preceded it, Suharto had to 
decide whether the P.N.I. would or would not be given a place 
in the constitutional order. On December 21, he instructed all 
regional government authorities to "help and provide opportun­
ities for the P.N.I. to effect crystallization and New Order 
consolidation within itself" and asked the parties, organiza­
tions, functional groups, and action fronts to refrain from 
disturbing this process. Several days later he sent the Acting 
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Panggabean, to Sumatra to 
negotiate an end to the bans on the party’s activities. When 
the "redressing" of parliament was completed, P. N. I. representa­
tion was down slightly, but the party still remained the largest 
of the parliamentary groupings.
The Masjumi and Socialist parties, which had been banned 
by Soekarno in 1960 on the ground that some of their leaders 
had been involved in the Sumatra-Sulawesi rebellion of two years 
before, presented Suharto with an analogous but more complex 
set of issues. There was no real problem in the case of the 
Socialist party (P.S.I.), as the leaders and active members of 
this organization, having little mass support and already ex­
ercising influence through the action fronts, non-party press, 
and the bureaucracy, did not press for their party’s re­
legalization. (An earlier attempt to establish a new party 
based on the Socialists and the national-communist Murba Party
10. This discussion of P.N.I. affairs is based heavily on the 
findings of Angus P. McIntyre of the University of Sydney 
and Yale University.
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had been abandoned.) But the leaders of the old Masjumi were 
active in their demands for a legitimate political vehicle, 
and these pressures presented the government with a serious 
dilemma.
What the Masjumi leaders stood for was highly congruent 
with some of the central ideas of the New Order. If anyone had 
stood up to Soekarno and the Communists from the beginning it 
was they. Moreover, it was widely argued that the Islamic 
militancy which troubled Suharto sporadically throughout 1967—  
most notably after the anti-Christian rioting which damaged 21 
churches in Makassar on October 1st —  could only be contained if 
both the liberal-modernist and fundamentalist streams of reform­
ist Islam, which had found political expression through the 
Masjumi before 1960, were again allowed some kind of legitimate 
representation.
On the other hand, various centrists within the army con­
tended that Islamic militancy was better suppressed than con­
ciliated; they also opposed any tendency to remove the stigma 
still attached to those who had been involved in the rebellion 
of 1958, arguing that these men were every bit as much traitors 
as the Communists. At the same time, some of the military 
radicals were against the idea of a neo-Masjumi because they saw 
this as likely to strengthen the party system as a whole, a sys­
tem they hoped to see destroyed, superseded, or at least radical­
ly transformed. Finally there was pressure against a neo- 
Masjumi from some of the leaders of the Masjumifs old rival, 
the Nahdatul Ulama.
Suharto had made it clear in late 1966 that he was opposed 
to a simple rehabilitation of the Masjumi, but there were 
numerous indications in early 1967 that he would allow a new 
party to come into being which would represent at least several 
of the groups which had previously worked through the Masjumi. 
After a short period in which it seemed that former Vice-President 
Hatta would be given the nod to lead such a party, the initiative 
and anticipated government blessing passed to a seven-man group 
led by K. H. Fakih Usman, a second-ranking member of the old 
Masjumi leadership who had not been involved in the rebellion.
From that time forth there were rumors every two months or so 
that a new Partai Muslimin Indonesia was about to come into for­
mal, government-endorsed existence; but each set of rumors proved 
mistaken.
The resolution finally came in early February. Immediately 
after a conference of regional military commanders which had dis­
cussed the question of the proposed new party, the members of 
Fakih Usman1s group were summoned to see Suharto, who told them 
that a Partai Muslimin Indonesia would be allowed to come into 
existence almost immediately--but not under their leadership, 
and indeed on tougher terms than previously foreshadowed. Any­
one who had either been involved in the 1958 rebellion or had
98
been a member of a Masjumi leadership committee at any level at 
the time of the party's dissolution in 1960 would be excluded 
from executive positions of any kind in the new party, at least 
until a party congress was held and a new executive elected.
This decision caused consternation in important sections of 
the reformist Muslim community, for it meant that very few reform­
ist leaders would be allowed to play a part in the new organiza­
tion who had not previously had political rights as members of 
the Muhammadijah, a large social and educational association 
which had had parliamentary representation for some years. Those 
who had hoped that the P.M.I. would be a neo-Masjumi rather than 
a Muhammadijah-writ-large were sharply disappointed. But the 
Muhammadijah leaders were happy to comply with Suharto's specifi­
cations, and so the Partai Muslimin Indonesia was formally 
established in February, under the chairmanship of the Muham­
madijah leader Djarnawi Hadikusumo.11
The M.P.R.S. Session of March 1968
On January 30 the acting president disclosed the terms of 
parliament's "redressing." Its membership would be raised from 
347 to 414. The representation of the armed services would be 
raised from 43 to 75, and the action fronts would gain 24 new 
seats. As for the parties, they were asked to draw up lists of 
members they wanted to recall and to discuss with him lists of 
men they wanted to put in their places. But each party would 
keep roughly the same total representation.
On February 13 Suharto installed 179 new members of parlia­
ment, 67 of them new men and 112 to replace ones who had been 
recalled. At the same time he disclosed that a new Supreme 
Advisory Council (D.P.A.) was about to be named. Coming on top 
of the appointment of a number of new Supreme Court judges, these 
actions suggested a sharp increase in the pace of governmental 
action. But the real drama was still to come.
On February 28 the reconstructed parliament met for the 
first time. Under strong pressure from two of Suharto's "project 
officers," it passed a most far-reaching resolution on that same 
night, partly for the consideration of the M.P.R.S. working com­
mittee, which was due to begin a meeting on the following morning. 
The M.P.R.S. should be called into session immediately, the 
parliamentary resolution said; it should appoint General Suharto 
full (as distinct from acting) president; it should endorse the 
government's proposals for a five-year development plan; and it 
should postpone elections for up to five years.
11. S. U. Bajasut, Facta Documents VI, Partai Muslimin Indonesia 
(n.p., 1968), contains almost all of the documents relevant 
to the founding of the P.M.I.
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A few days later, the M.P.R.S. working committee drew up a 
time-table for the congress session. It would meet between 
March 21 and March 27, enabling Suharto to leave Indonesia on 
March 28 for a scheduled state visit to Japan (and to leave as 
full president, government supporters added).
This indecorous pressuring of parliament gave rise to pro­
tests from a wide range of civilians and to repeated demonstra­
tions from the student action fronts. Few of the protesters 
were opposed to the renewal of Suharto’s mandate. (Some Suharto 
supporters were convinced that Nasution was determined to oust 
Suharto when the opportunity came; but if this was his intention 
he evidently did not believe the time had yet arrived, for he 
kept silent.) Many people were opposed to postponing elections 
for as long as five years, and they were not only from the 
parties but also from the high school students' action front, 
K.A.P.P.I., whose leadership was dominated by reformist Muslims. 
But the most widespread feeling was simply that the government 
was asking for too much and giving nothing in return— particular­
ly in relation to persistent demands for the investigation of 
leading generals alleged to be big-time corruptors. Indeed, it 
was felt the government was not asking but imposing its demands, 
treating the country's legislative bodies with frivolous dis­
respect. Rosihan Anwar, the country's foremost columnist, ex­
pressed a common resentment with the military high-handedness 
which seemed to characterize the whole procedure when he wrote 
mockingly about the "project officers" assigned to "prepare" the 
general session of the M.P.R.S. so that it would achieve its 
"target" within the "time limit" set down and with the "logistics" 
employed.12
The government's response to the wave of protests was tough. 
Six student leaders were arrested early in the month, as was the 
chairman of the intellectuals' action front, K.A.S.I. Student 
demonstrators were injured by soldiers on at least two occasions. 
The army commander for Greater Djakarta announced that he would 
have thirty battalions at the ready for the M.P.R.S. session, 
and the top civilian of the government newsagency Antara (a
12. Kompas, March 8, 1968. It should be emphasized, however, 
that generalizations of this kind encompass only a tiny 
proportion of the Indonesian population. The political 
public whose attitudes I am trying to picture here is 
limited in the first instance to people aware of the cur­
rents of week-to-week politics in the capital; this is 
roughly the group of those who read Djakarta newspapers 
regularly, perhaps one million people of the country's 115 
million. And among these it is limited to people who are 
thought of as having a right to participate in the politics 
of the New Order--which excludes all Communists, many 
P.N.I. men, and a great number of Chinese.
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subordinate of Antara's military head) was sent overseas for 
several months. A few days before the opening day of the 
congress soldiers were posted at several of the universities 
and high schools in the capital. In addition, army men checked 
all transport coming into the city, looking particularly for 
students.
Civilians spoke more and more of the government's "bull­
dozer" and "steamroller" tactics. Rosihan Anwar, writing on 
the eve of the M.P.R.S. session, quoted approvingly a Sydney 
Morning Herald description of Djakarta as being in "an explo­
sive mood of disillusion."13 14 More than ever before, politics 
was a matter of the army versus the civilians.
The most important issues the M.P.R.S. tackled were those 
which flowed from the controversial parliamentary resolution 
of February 28-29. Would Suharto be named full president? If 
so, would this be with a reaffirmation of the sweeping emergency 
powers conferred upon him, first by Soekarno in March 1966, and 
then by the M.P.R.S. session of June-July 1967— powers which 
allowed him "to take any actions he deems necessary for the 
security, peace, and stability of the process of government or 
the furtherance of the Revolution"? How long would his new 
mandate be valid? Would it be somehow tied to the Five Year 
Development Plan? And what would be the date by which M.P.R.S. 
elections must be held? Related issues were raised by civilians 
who wanted to compel Suharto to give a full account of his 
stewardship thus far (including the matter of alleged corruption 
among his assistants), and by others who wanted additional 
legislation on the subject of human rights.
But there were also a number of quite separate issues, 
particularly the matter of the vice-presidency. Names bandied 
about in this connection included those of Hatta, Nasution,
Adam Malik, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Major General Alamsjah,
H. M. Subchan Z. E. and Imron Rosjadi of the Nahdatul Ulama, and 
Lieutenant General T. B. Simatupang. There was the demand that 
Soekarno soon be tried, and there was also the draft prepared 
by the M.P.R.S. working committee for a Basic State Policy, 
which was to function as a kind of successor to Soekarno's 
Political Manifesto of 1959. This last item was particularly 
controversial because it raised again the old issue of Islam 
and the Pantja Sila (the Five Principles first enunciated by 
Soekarno in June 1945 and including affirmation of belief in 
"the One Divinity"). The working committee draft referred to 
"the Pantja Sila as interpreted in the Spirit of the Djakarta 
Charter," referring to the charter drawn up in June 1945, which 
spoke of the "obligation of Muslims to adhere to Islamic law."11'
13. Kompas, March 21, 1968.
14. On the Djakarta Charter controversy, see Lev, op. cit., 
pp. 2 5 7 ff.
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The government and its army representatives seem to have 
placed the M.P.R.S. members under a great deal of pressure in 
the course of the session. Almost all of the proceedings were 
held behind closed doors, but members made such private com­
ments as, "They brand you as an enemy if you criticise them ever 
so slightly," and "Being in there is a real test of one's moral 
courage." In the end, however, the government showed a measure 
of flexibility, acceding to the demands of its critics at 
several important points.
On the evening of March 27 General Suharto was sworn in as 
president and for a five-year term. But his emergency powers had 
been specified and thus narrowed somewhat. And elections would 
have to be held by July 1971, before the end of Suharto's five- 
year term and long before the completion of the Five Year Develop­
ment Plan, which was scheduled to begin in January 1969. The 
post of vice-president was not filled, but Suharto did made arrange­
ments (without going through the M.P.R.S.) for Sultan Hamengku 
Buwono of Jogjakarta, the Minister of State for Economic, Finan­
cial, and Industrial Affairs, to act as the "Custodian of Presi­
dential Functions" while he was away in Japan and Cambodia. The 
government declared it would take legal action against ex-Presi- 
dent Soekarno when the relevant preparations had been completed—  
but it did not commit itself to a deadline. And it was deter­
mined that the president-elect would form a new Development 
Cabinet before July 5--but Suharto made no commitment to reduce 
the number of military men in ministerial posts, lessen the 
powers of members of his personal staff, or proceed in any new 
way against alleged corruptors.
On the following morning Suharto flew north. But the M.P.R.S. 
continued in session. Two of its commissions, those working on 
the proposed Basic State Policy and the new human rights statute, 
were locked in conflict, and argued on for two days. In neither 
case, however, was the deadlock resolved. One report has it that 
the Muslim groups wanted a decision taken by majority vote in the 
Basic State Policy commission, and that the army men in the com­
mission prevented this. In any event, the problem was left for 
the next session of the M.P.R.S., as was that of human rights.
A New Pattern of Alignments?
The inside politics of the M.P.R.S. session was as complex 
as it was tense, and my knowledge of it is scant and fragmentary. 
But it seems that the alignment patterns which had appeared 
reasonably firmly established only three or four months earlier 
had been shaken. In the first place, the various Muslim groups 
were combining (across the lines dividing Masjumi from Nahdatul 
Ulama and separating the militant, centrist, and laggard sup­
porters of the New Order) to present a more or less unified 
challenge to a government which they saw as dominated by
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Javanese generals of abangan religious orientation. There was 
nothing surprising in the fact that the various Muslim groups 
were able to work together closely on the Basic State Policy 
issue. But they also managed to work together fairly well 
against the president's being given full emergency powers and 
against a five-year postponement of the elections. (According 
to one report, they were assisted throughout by General Nasution 
as chairman of the M.P.R.S. This would tally with the fact that 
Nasution was the most strongly Muslim of the senior generals, one 
of the most isolated, and the one with the greatest jurisdictional 
interest in the strength of the legislative branch.) Conversely, 
leaders of the nationalist P.N.I. were among the strongest sup­
porters of wide presidential emergency powers.
The increasing cohesion of the Islamic political groups 
can be seen as a manifestation of the Muslim frustration, grow­
ing since 1966, which gave rise to sharp cleavages in the stu­
dents' and intellectuals’ action fronts in 1967 and reached a 
climax in the anti-Christian rioting in Makassar on October 1 
of that year. This frustration arose partly because the men of 
the Muslim political organizations, who had been in the fore­
front of tlje anti-Communist struggle both before 1965 and after­
wards, were subsequently given few positions of power. It was 
also a response to the advances which the Christians had been 
making in the post-coup period, particularly among the abangan 
nominal Muslims who had been socio-cultural adherents of the 
Communists before 1965. In addition, the Middle Eastern war of 
June 1967 did much to fan militant Muslim feeling. And there 
were many subtler and less immediately political factors at work, 
factors which contributed to fundamentalist responses to 
secularization and to a crisis of reformist leadership.
Even more important, the M.P.R.S. session showed politics 
as a matter of the army versus the civilians, and to some 
extent the armed forces versus the civilians. It is true that 
one can point to General Nasution as a military man siding 
with the civilians and to Mashuri, the Director-General of 
Higher Education and a key member of Suharto's "kitchen cabinet," 
as a civilian siding with the army. But these are exceptions 
of the kind which proves a rule: for the sides were indeed
the civilians and the military. Most army leaders saw Nasution 
not as a link with the civilians but as a renegade soldier, 
and most civilian politicians took a similar view of Mashuri.
The civil-military partnership of New Order militants— Major 
Generals Kemal Idris and Dharsono on the one side, Dr. Umar 
Kayam's Independent Group and like-minded organizations on 
the other— was scarcely in evidence. The Independent Group had 
split and been cut off from one of its key channels of influ­
ence as a result of an acrimonious disagreement between Umar 
Kayam and Mashuri, two men who had previously been very close.
And Generals Dharsono and Kemal Idris, who had been such
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embarrassingly vocal critics of the men around Suharto, were now 
all but silent. The army seemed unprecedentedly united behind 
its leaders, the civilians put in their place as never before.
At the most straightforward level, much of the officer sup­
port which had accrued to Generals Kemal Idris and Dharsono 
earlier, because they seemed to stand for dynamic, decisive action 
and against the government’s slowness and drift, fell away when 
Suharto himself began to act decisively in the months between 
January and March. But it is probably necessary to see the change 
in somewhat longer perspective, as an aspect of the withering 
away of a coalition which had been called into existence by the 
events of 1966. It was a coalition of the army with groups of 
students and intellectuals (predominantly academic and non-party) 
which forced Soekamo to shed his power, and officers like Kemal 
Idris, Dharsono, and the paracommando head and students1 hero 
Sarwo Edhie, were key link figures in this coalition relation­
ship. But once the army was clearly in the saddle its relation­
ship to the students and intellectuals gradually changed. Some 
of the intellectuals, particularly academic economists, remained 
important as policy advisers, executives of economic agencies, 
and foreign aid negotiators. Others retained influence because 
of their significance as legitimizers of the regime. But the 
students were more often an annoyance than a help. As far as 
they were concerned, the special relationship had become a mere 
shadow of what it had been: t!New Order partnerhip" had become a 
phrase of symbolic reassurance, increasingly bare of real 
political content.
The February-March pattern of military-civilian relations 
clearly reflects an increased disposition on the part of General 
Suharto to govern by coercion. In general, Suharto has been con­
cerned to minimize his use of coercive methods— except in rela­
tion to the Communists and their immediate allies--and willing 
to operate from a relatively broad political base even where 
this has meant slow decisions. But the need to clear up a 
great deal of government business before and during the M.P.R.S. 
session evidently led him to depart from this approach.
In addition, the adverse political winds of the last months 
of 1967 must have played some part in disposing the general to 
use more heavy-handed methods. Dissatisfaction with his govern­
ment had been high that year, and he had found that there was 
little he could do to respond positively to the demands of 
civilian political groups. The economic policies on which he 
had embarked were likely to remain heavily deprivational for 
some time. Granted the tenuous balances of intra-army politics, 
it would have been difficult for him to remove officers from 
any significant portion of the many coveted positions they held 
in civilian administration and in government firms. And it 
would also have been risky to throw out any of the key generals 
in the S.P.R.I. and the government economic agencies who were
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the principal targets of allegations of corruption. In addi­
tion, he may well have been worried by the prospect of the 
additional strain on his resources arising from the new vigor 
of Communist guerrilla activity in early 1968, particularly 
in southern East Java.15 What then, he may well have asked, 
was the point of allowing the civilians so much freedom to 
vent their demands? Was this not fanning the general sense 
of grievance, producing gratuitous frustration? Was it not 
clear that the critics had been asking for too much? Was it 
not time that they were taught this, taught that he, Suharto, 
could also be tough?
The Dilemmas of Coercion
Factors like these suggest that the government's steam­
roller style at the M.P.R.S. session may have been more than 
a momentary show of force to cut through a particular knot 
of problems, that the Suharto government may have committed 
itself at that point to working from a narrowed political base 
and to bargain less with organized civilian political group­
ings. But a glance at some of the factors militating against 
an attempt to govern in a generally more coercive manner makes 
one reluctant to suggest this as a firm conclusion.
There remains a great deal of truth in Soedjatmoko's view 
that "Indonesia's political pluralism, rooted in the variety 
of her cultural history, impels the nation towards . . . 
arrangements through which conflicts of interest and viewpoint 
are accommodated with a minimum of coercion."16 The political 
polycentricity born of the legacy of cultural variety means 
that any single group aspiring to establish tight and exclusive 
control over all others will tend to draw these others into a 
coalition directed against itself.
But it is not only Indonesia's cultural heritage which 
tends to maintain political pluralism. It is also the more 
recent legacy of bureaucratic power and flaccidity. Suharto, 
like Soekarno before him, lacks a tightly knit organization 
through which to give coherent effect to his policies and to 
strike accurately at his enemies. The regular bureaucracy is 
anything but such a weapon. A ramshackle assemblage of over­
staffed agencies and undersalaried but powerful and accessible 
officials, it persistently bends government policies in a 
variety of directions at once. Nor does the army serve as a 
substitute. It is too far intermeshed with the regular
15. On this see the series of articles in Harian Kami, May 15,
16, 17, 18, 1968.
16. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities,"
Australian Outlook (XXI, 3) December 1967, p. 281.
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administration and caught in its web of favor-trading relation­
ships, and it is too arena-like itself, its parts susceptible to 
sectional and regional pressures.
Suharto’s capacity to govern coercively is thus subject to 
a variety of limitations. On the one hand, he cannot afford to 
antagonize too many groups of people in the bureaucracy and re­
lated organizations (officials of government firms, village heads, 
and so on), for he must continually plead for the support of 
these people to secure a modicum of consistency in the way his 
policies are carried into effect. Moreover, they and their im­
mediate kin make up a large part of the higher strata of Indonesian 
society, to which all governments are effectively accountable.
On the other hand, Suharto must hesitate before he intro­
duces measures which will add to the pressure which the govern­
ment exerts on the great mass of the population, for he knows that 
most such measures are likely to be implemented in distorted 
fashion at the local level and to be used as warrants for more 
regulatory activity hampering the flow of trade. Government has 
borne down quite heavily on this great mass of lower-class people, 
and it has done so in fairly arbitrary fashion— witness the many 
illegal tolls, the often very high cost of bribes for formally 
free government services, and the not infrequent demands by local 
officials for unpaid labor. This was the situation in the Soekarno 
period; it is much the same now, and is aggravated inasmuch as in­
creased numbers of villagers and lower-class townsmen now live 
under political arrest or in its shadow. Suharto could no doubt 
intensify pressure of this kind. Harrassed by the many demands 
made on him by the politically influential, most of whom are social­
ly tied to the bureaucracy, he could well see it as in his inter­
est to tilt the balance of social power still further in favor of 
the bureaucracy and its appendages, for this would probably in­
crease his leverage over them, at least in the short run. But 
most of the changes he could initiate in this direction would 
have markedly adverse consequences for the policies of economic 
regeneration to which he is tied by both domestic political commit­
ment and international financial dependence. And there are no in­
dications that the general has reduced the high priority he has 
given to economic performance.
In the last instance, therefore, we can only say the M.P.R.S. 
produced decisions on the formal aspects of political structure 
under the New Order. For the informal qualities of the new 
regime, and specifically for the fundamental question of how much 
the government will bargain and how much rely on coercion in 
dealing with civilian groups, we must wait for the future to 
reveal a settled pattern of practice.
